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Dow Chemical vs. ‘Coercive Utopians’:  Constructing 
the Contested Ground of Science and Government 
Regulation in 1970s America 
 
Amy M. Hay 
 
In 1979, the Dow Chemical Company published an excerpt from a 
speech by H. Peter Metzger that announced an emerging conflict 
in American ideals and public policy. He stated that a new kind of 
individual inhabited Washington, people from the counterculture 
who were “coercive utopians” because they sought to achieve their 
agenda through covert actions and hoped to end the American free 
market economy. Following the 1962 publication of Rachel 
Carson’s Silent Spring and the subsequent banning of DDT in 
1972, Dow and other chemical manufacturers fought to keep the 
regulatory climate favorable to industry. Dow found itself 
defending the phenoxy herbicide 2,4,5-T in particular for almost 
the entire decade of the 1970s. Using Dow Chemical Company 
records, trial transcripts, scientific journals, and writings by 
environmental activists, it becomes possible to see the contested 
landscape of scientific knowledge and chemical regulation. This 
essay argues that Metzger's “coercive utopians” challenged the 
assumed scientific basis of chemical safety and used the regulatory 
powers of the state to reassess the safety of everyday chemicals. 
This established a pattern of contested knowledge and ideological 
conflict that continues to form the core of debate between public 
safety and free-market prerogative.  
 
“The environmentalists have had the biggest victories:  Ranking jobs . . . 
have gone to men and women who have . . . lobbied . . . for conservation, 
protection of wildlife and clear air and water.”1 With these words, social 
                                                 
1 “The Point Is . . . :  A Summary of Public Issues Important to the Dow Chemical 
Company,” no. 8, 21 Dec. 1979, folder 6471, box 215, series IX, “Media Response,” 
unprocessed, Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange, National Agricultural 
Library, Beltsville, Md., hereafter cited as the Young Collection. 
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critic H. Peter Metzger observed the kind of people populating Washing-
ton, D.C., and various government agencies under the Jimmy Carter 
administration. He went on to distinguish such individuals as different 
from the usual political appointees, the beneficiaries of the routine spoils 
system.  These members of the counterculture, he warned, wanted to do 
more than simply enjoy political patronage; they wanted to dismantle the 
basic mechanisms for generating wealth in the country.  These “coercive 
utopians,” as Metzger labeled them, sought to achieve their goals covertly.  
Those goals included a reduction in per capita energy consumption, a shift 
from fossil fuels to solar energy, and an undetermined form of economy 
that bore no relation to capitalism or private ownership. Metzger’s 
warning appeared in a 1979 Dow Chemical Company brochure and re-
vealed the growing concern the chemical industry in general, and Dow in 
particular, held toward the new regulatory climate that had emerged in 
Washington during the 1970s. For Dow and corporations like it, new 
legislation like the 1969 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), newly 
created agencies like the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and 
new advisory bodies like the president’s Council on Environmental Quality 
(CEQ) all heralded a new regime of public interest that would “strangle” 
society through regulation, review, and repeal of existing and potential 
chemical licenses and legislation.  During the decade of the 1970s, from 
the banning of DDT in 1972 through the controversy over the herbicide 
2,4,5-T and its associated dioxin contaminant at the end of the decade, 
Dow would fight these “coercive utopians” and their vision of a govern-
ment more responsive to the health and ecological concerns of ordinary 
Americans. This established a pattern of contested knowledge and 
ideological conflict that continues to form the core of debate between 
public safety and free-market prerogative. 
The Dow Chemical Company ranked as the second most profitable 
industrial chemical producer in the United States in 1993, with revenues of 
$12.5 billion, behind only DuPont’s $15.6 billion in revenue.2 Founder 
Herbert Dow located the company in Midland, Michigan, and the 
company grew in tandem with the twentieth century. It started as a major 
supplier of chlorine-based bleaching powder and caustic soda produced 
through an electrolytic process. The company began making sodium 
chloride, which initially was used to produce synthetic chloroform, and 
later used to make magnesium and calcium chloride. Chloroform 
manufacture generated carbon tetrachloride, a major component of 
agricultural chemicals and pesticides.  
Dow entered the field of petrochemicals in the 1930s. This decade saw 
the development of two major chemical products, Styron and vinylidene 
chloride, which in turn were the basis of Styrofoam and Saran. These 
products meant that Dow’s major profits came from supplying the 
                                                 
2 Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Shaping the Industrial Century: The Remarkable Story 
of the Evolution of the Modern Chemical and Pharmaceutical Industries 
(Cambridge, Mass., 2005), 13. 
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ingredients for household items like plastic wrap and cleaners.  
Agricultural chemicals represented a small portion of the company’s 
product profile.3       
Financially, the 1970s were for chemical companies, in the words of 
business historian Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., a “turbulent decade.”4 The 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Counties (OPEC) successfully raised 
the price of a barrel of crude oil from $2 to almost $30. The economy more 
broadly suffered from stagnation, and for some, the increased scrutiny of 
chemical regulations endangered popular products. Dow, along with other 
chemical manufacturers, had acquired the right to produce 2,4-D and 
2,4,5-T at the end of the Second World War. Initially researched as plant 
growth regulators, the phenoxy herbicides represented a major component 
of the U.S. development of biological weapons during the 1940s through a 
partnership between university and military scientists. Their use as 
biological weapons came about with the realization that these hormone-
like substances could be used to kill plants through an acceleration of 
growth. The commercial application of these plant growth inhibitors as 
effective plant herbicides had begun almost before the war had ended.5  
Along with the organochlorine insecticide DDT, synthetic fertilizers, and 
new farm equipment, the phenoxy herbicides represented one of the major 
discoveries with agricultural applications made during World War II.6  
Legal maneuvering stripped American Chemical’s patent rights to the 
herbicides, and the major chemical companies shared production of the 
herbicides after the war.7 Although they were not a major part of Dow’s 
chemical product line, commercial herbicides generated significant 
revenue, growing to over 70,000 acres treated with herbicides for total 
expenditures of $270,750,000 in 1962.8  
One other important episode needs to be discussed before examining 
the 1970s and Dow’s battles against the “coercive utopians” in more detail.  
As part of a larger pattern of student protest against the Vietnam War, 
described in one contemporary account as “unrestrained anarchy,” Dow 
Chemical became a nationally recognized name because of its manufacture 
of a military weapon, napalm B.9  Napalm, essentially jellied gasoline in its 
                                                 
3 Chandler, Shaping the Industrial Century, 55-56. 
4 Ibid., 28. 
5 Gale E. Peterson, “The Discovery and Development of 2,4-D,” Agricultural 
History 41 (July 1967): 244-48. 
6 Nicholas Rasmussen, “Plant Hormones in War and Peace: Science, Industry, 
and Government in the Development of Herbicides in 1940s America,” Isis 92 
(June 2001): 294. 
7 Rasmussen, “Plant Hormones in War and Peace,” 308, 309. 
8 Peterson, “Discovery and Development,” 243. 
 
 
9 Philip Boffey, “Campus Unrest: Riots Bring Danger of Punitive Backlash,” 
Science, n.s., 164 (11 April 1969): 165; Patrick D. Kennedy, “Reactions against the 
Vietnam War and Military-Related Targets on Campus: The University of Illinois 
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modern form, had many previous incarnations in warfare dating back to 
Greek fire. U.S. military leaders argued for its use in South Vietnam 
because of the entrenched nature of enemy troops. In 1966, Dow was the 
second biggest contractor for napalm after United Technology Center, 
which had begun to experience protests against their production of 
napalm at their Redwood City, California, plant.10 After 1966, during the 
escalation of the Vietnam War and protests against it, Dow Chemical 
became the only producer of napalm B after the other chemical 
manufacturers discontinued production in response to anti-war protests.  
The first demonstrations against Dow occurred at its New York City 
headquarters, where demonstrators marched and urged the boycotting of 
Saran Wrap. The company responded by noting that it supported the right 
of all Americans to non-violent, legal protest. The official statement went 
on to give the company’s position: “Our position on the manufacture of 
napalm is that we are a supplier of goods to the Defense Department and 
not a policy maker. . . . Simple good citizenship requires that we supply our 
government and our military with those goods which they feel they need. . 
. .”11 The decision thrust Dow into the national spotlight, as antiwar 
demonstrations spread to college campuses across the country, and Dow 
recruiters became prime targets.   
While initially student protests had focused on Dow’s Midland 
headquarters, the first campus protests took place at Wayne State 
University in Detroit during Dow’s 1966 recruiting campaign.  Military and 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) recruitment moved off-campus, 
preventing students from disrupting their recruitment activities. Dow, 
confident of their ethical stance, remained on campus. As antiwar 
sentiments intensified, so too did the Dow campus protests.12 There were 
over 133 campus incidents in 1967, beginning with a violent demonstra-
tion at Los Angeles State College. Recruiters were taken to another 
building after demonstrators flooded the original site. The men escaped a 
student mob through a back window, fought their way to their car, and 
eventually were able to drive the car away. Perhaps the most visible 
violence broke out later that year at the University of Wisconsin’s Madison 
campus, after the Dow recruiter was prevented from leaving the building 
by over two hundred student protesters. When student demonstrators 
refused to leave the building, campus security called in local police. Sixty-
five people were injured, including three policemen; nine students were 
                                                                                                                                     
as a Case Study, 1965-1972,” Illinois Historical Journal 84 (Summer 1991): 101-
18. 
10 Lawrence E. Davies, “Napalm Foes Petition for Vote to Bar Factory in Coast 
City,” New York Times, 17 April 1967, p. 8; E. N. Brandt, Growth Company:  
Dow Chemical’s First Century (East Lansing, Mich., 1997), 352, 353. 
11 Brandt, Growth Company, 353. 
12 Ibid., 354, 355. 
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arrested, and police used tear gas to disburse the protesters.13 Following a 
protest at Harvard on October 26, Dow officials declared they would 
ignore campus protests and continue their recruitment efforts.14 Later that 
year, Dow chairman Carl Gerstacker admitted that the protests had hurt 
Dow; consumers were urged to boycott its products and divest its stocks, 
and the company had to devote considerable time addressing the problem.  
He again asserted, however, Dow’s commitment to supplying “American 
soldiers in Vietnam” the weapons they needed to fight the war.15 Dow 
received public support from the president of IBM, who challenged 
protesters’ demands that Dow quit manufacturing napalm and pointed out 
that almost all companies were contributing to the war in Vietnam.16 From 
1966 through the end of 1967, Dow recruiters experienced five hundred 
demonstrations on three hundred college campuses. Although the protests 
appeared not to have damaged Dow’s recruitment efforts, and the 
company itself boasted of its successful resistance to antiwar pressure even 
after it quit producing napalm, the years 1966 to 1969 saw the company 
engaged in a national battle against what one company insider called the 
“Flower Children” over one of its products.17   
In 1970 came an embarrassing admission from Dow vice-president 
Julius Johnson, testifying before a House Subcommittee on the “Effects of 
2,4,5-T on Man and the Environment,” chaired by Michigan Senator Philip 
Hart. Johnson testified that samples of 2,4,5-T submitted for analysis by 
Bionetics Research Laboratories in 1964 contained significant amounts of 
a contaminant commonly known as dioxin, a highly toxic substance. In his 
testimony, Johnson argued that current testing measures had identified 
high levels of dioxin in the 2,4,5-T herbicide produced by the company in 
1964, and that current production had decreased dioxin contamination to 
trace levels. He recommended a review of communications and protocol 
even as he urged that regulatory decisions over matters of science continue 
to be based on scientific evidence and expertise.18 Ten years later, Dr. 
                                                 
13 C. Gerald Fraser, “Antiwar Protest Ends in Violence,” New York Times, 19 Oct. 
1967, p. 8; Brandt, Growth Company, 355, 356. 
14 “Harvard Protest Delays Dow Aide,” New York Times, 26 Oct. 1967, p. 7; Gerd 
Wilcke, “Dow Will Ignore Campus Protests,” New York Times, 27 Oct. 1967, p. 6. 
15 “Dow Chief Says Protests Hurt,” New York Times, 18 Nov. 1967, p. 14. 
16 “Napalm—A Useful but not a Pretty Weapon,” New York Times, 20 Dec. 1967, 
p. 247.  
17 Anthony Ripley, “Napalm Protests Worrying Dow, though Company Is 
Unhurt,” New York Times, 11 Dec. 1967, p. 2; Robert J. Cole, “ ‘Keep your cool,’ 
Dow Advises Targets of Antiwar Protesters,” New York Times, 4 June 1970, p. 59; 
Brandt, Growth Company, 351-62. 
 
 
18 Julius E. Johnson, “Statement of Dr. Julius E. Johnson, Vice President, Dow 
Chemical Company, April 7 and 15, 1970,” Hearings Before the Subcommittee on 
Energy, Natural Resources, and the Environment of the Committee on 
Commerce; United States Senate, Ninety-First Congress, Second Session on 
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Samuel Epstein, a vocal critic of U.S. chemical regulatory policy, would 
charge that Dow had knowingly withheld information about the toxicity of 
the 2,4,5-T produced for the manufacture of Agent Orange herbicides used 
during the war from 1964 until 1970.19 Dow spent the decade defending its 
phenoxy herbicides in general, and 2,4,5-T in particular. Three key events 
put the company on the defensive: the production and use of Agent 
Orange herbicides as a chemical defoliant during the Vietnam War; the 
1970 creation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and transfer 
of chemical regulation to that agency from the Department of Agriculture 
USDA); and the 1972 banning of the insecticide DDT. 
When efforts to use fires to clear jungle growth in South Vietnam 
failed, the phenoxy herbicides once again drew military interest. What 
would eventually be called Operation Ranch Hand gained Secretary of 
Defense Robert McNamara’s support in 1961, and defoliation operations 
began in January 1962, the same year Silent Spring was published. Over 
the next ten years the United States released approximately eleven million 
gallons of an equal measure of 2,4,5-T and 2,4-D, which came to be known 
as Agent Orange, over the South Vietnamese countryside. Along with 
Orange, which received its name from the orange stripe around storage 
barrels, Agents Blue and White were designed to destroy crops, depriving 
Viet Cong soldiers of food and forest brush cover that might hide enemy 
troops.20   
From the beginning spraying operations received heavy criticism.  
Antiwar activists charged that the herbicide campaign qualified as 
chemical warfare and violated the 1925 Geneva Convention prohibition on 
such military weapons. Others raised questions about the ethics of 
destroying crops in a part of the world that routinely saw people die of 
starvation. As the war continued, and the amount of herbicides used 
increased, biological and environmental scientists began expressing 
concerns about the possible long-term effects of herbicide defoliation on 
the Vietnamese countryside and possible harmful health effects on the 
Vietnamese people.21 In 1969, the release of a report conducted by the 
                                                                                                                                     
Effects of 2,4,5-T on Man and the Environment, April 7 and 15, 1970 
(Washington, D.C., 1970). 
19 Karen DeWitt, “House Hearing Is Told Dow Knew in 1964 That Defoliant Was 
Toxic,” New York Times, 23 July 1980, A18. 
20 Alvin L. Young, “The Toxicology, Environmental Fate, and Human Risk of 
Herbicide Orange and Its Associated Dioxin,” Technical Report (Brooks Air Force 




21 Charles Mohr, “U.S. Spray Planes Destroy Rice in Vietcong Territory,” New 
York Times, 21 Dec. 1965, p. 1; Benjamin Welles, “Pentagon Backs the Use of 
Chemicals,” New York Times, 20 Sept. 1966, p. 1; Russell Betts and Frank 
Detton, An Evaluation of Chemical Crop Destruction in Vietnam (Memorandum:  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Oct. 1967), 8, 9; Edward B. Fiske, 
“Clerics Accuse U.S. of War Crimes,” New York Times, 4 Feb. 1968, p. 1; Bryce 
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Bionetics Research Laboratories for the National Cancer Institute 
attracted even more critics. The report suggested that the phenoxy 
herbicides potentially could cause human harm, including birth defects. A 
follow-up investigation commissioned by the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare was undertaken, with the results released late in 
1969. The Mrak Report supported the conclusions of the Bionetics study, 
and recommended that 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T both be immediately restricted 
to prevent human exposure. These health studies only intensified the 
public debate over the defoliation campaign and fueled further 
investigation on the part of government and scientific societies. The 
Department of Defense sponsored a study of the ecological effects of heavy 
herbicide usage in 1967, while the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science sent a team of scientists to Vietnam in 1970 to 
evaluate the environmental harm to the Vietnamese people and mangrove 
forests. Concerns over the safety of DDT, the pesticide singled out in Silent 
Spring, had already forced Richard Nixon’s administration to begin 
revising federal chemical regulation and environmental policy.22   
Nixon appointed a commission to study the effects of pesticides, the 
very Mrak Commission that supported the findings of the Bionetics study.  
As a result of the Mrak Commission’s findings, early in 1970 the USDA 
cancelled all residential use of DDT, with further review of other uses of 
the chemical (agricultural and industrial) expected to follow. An article by 
Thomas Whiteside on defoliation operations published in The New Yorker 
prompted the Senate to set up a Subcommittee, headed by Democrat 
Senator Philip Hart, to investigate pesticide use. Congressional repre-
sentative Richard D. McCarthy (D-NY) entered his findings from hearings 
held in Globe, Arizona, where residents charged that U.S. Forest Service 
spraying of the Tonto National Forest had produced deformities in 
domestic animals. Opponents of defoliation used the public questioning of 
pesticide safety to urge stopping spraying operations in Vietnam.23 Nixon 
and his advisors thought that the creation of the Environmental Protection 
Agency in 1970 would help the administration promote itself as pro-
                                                                                                                                     
Nelson, “Herbicides in Vietnam:  AAAS Board Seeks Field Study,” Science 163 (3 
Jan. 1969): 58, 59; Arthur W. Galston, Letter to the Editor, “Defoliants in 
Vietnam,” New York Times, 2 Oct. 1969, p. 46; Thomas Whiteside, “Defoliation,” 
The New Yorker (7 Feb. 1970), 32-69. 
22 W. B. House, et al., Assessment of Ecological Effects of Extensive or Repeated 
Use of Herbicides (Kansas City, Missouri:  Midwest Research Institute/DOD, 
1967); J. Brooks Flippen, “Pests, Pollution, and Politics: The Nixon Admin-
istration’s Pesticide Policy,” Agricultural History 71 (Fall 1997): 443-45. 
23 “Major Congressional Action: Effects of Herbicides,” 1970 CQ Almanac (Feb. 
1970), 495, folder 10, box 3, Paul Cecil Collection (Texas Tech University:  The 
Virtual Vietnam Archive); hereafter cited as the Cecil Collection; for 
congressional debates on defoliation, see “Environmental Warfare in Vietnam,” 
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environmental, while at the same time protecting the interests of 
agriculture and industry. As a result of the new agency, the oversight of 
pesticides moved from the Department of Agriculture to the EPA.   
The USDA’s previous oversight of pesticide regulation and the fact that 
it oversaw the Forest Service, a major user of herbicides during the 1970s, 
meant that agency officials and scientists remained significantly influential 
regarding pesticide policy. This influence also complicated things for 
officials at the EPA, as they increasingly found themselves charged with 
investigating and regulating issues of environmental risk. After months of 
political posturing, industry legal action, and bureaucratic maneuvering, 
the Nixon White House banned the use of Agent Orange in Vietnam in 
April 1970, but Agent Orange herbicides continued to be sold domestically 
despite official EPA cancellation of 2,4,5-T’s registration.24 In 1971, after 
Johnson’s testimony at the Hart hearings, Dow and Hercules, Inc., sought 
to void the cancellation of 2,4,5-T. This allowed the companies to continue 
selling the herbicide while a special advisory committee was formed to 
perform the administrative review. The nine-member committee, drawn 
from members of the National Academy of Sciences, submitted a report to 
the EPA. Leaks of the unpublished report suggested that it was 
contradictory at best, disingenuous at worst. The major problem with 
2,4,5-T, the committee asserted, lay with its contamination with dioxin.  
Such minor “environmental leaks” were acceptable in the eyes of the 
committee.25 EPA administrator William D. Ruckelshaus decided, 
however, to continue the existing restrictions on 2,4,5-T in contradiction 
to the advisory committee’s recommendation. Ruckelshaus’ decision 
highlighted the “shambles into which the official decision-making 
machinery [of the EPA] has lapsed.”26 Domestic use of 2,4,5-T would 
continue.  A commentary on the embarrassing role played by the National 
                                                 
24 The actual process by which Agent Orange was discontinued and the different 
policy decisions, agencies, and legal action make for a very confusing story. I have 
significantly compressed and summarized this process for this essay. For a 
history of the association between the USDA’s Bureau of Entomology and 
industry, see Thomas R. Dunlap, “Farmers, Scientists, and Insects,” Agricultural 
History 54, in “Agricultural History Symposium: Science and Technology in 
Agriculture” (Jan. 1980):  93-107; Jonathan B. Tucker, “A Farewell to Germs: The 
U.S. Renunciation of Biological and Toxin Warfare, 1969-1970,” International 
Security 27 (Summer 2002): 107-48, discusses the evolution of Nixon’s policy 
and the eventual banning of Agent Orange in Vietnam; Carol Van Strum, A Bitter 
Fog: Herbicides and Human Rights (San Francisco, 1983), 14, 15; for the EPA’s 
charge, see Sheila Jasanoff, “Science, Politics, and the Renegotiation of Expertise 
at EPA,” Osiris, 2d ser.,  7, “Science after ’40” (1992): 197, 198.   
25 Thomas Whiteside, “Department of Amplifications” The New Yorker (14 Aug. 
1971), folder 09, box 02, Douglas Pike Collection: Unit 03 - Technology, accessed 
on The Virtual Vietnam Archive, Texas Tech University.  
26 Nicholas Wade, “Decision on 2,45-T: Leaked Report Compels Regulatory 
Responsibility,” Science, n.s., 173 (13 Aug. 1971): 615. 
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Academy of Sciences, which provided a list of possible candidates, but had 
no say in who was chosen for the committee, pointed to the approval 
expressed by industry groups like the National Agricultural Chemicals 
Association. “With verdicts like that of the 2,4,5-T committee, the 
pesticide manufacturers’ satisfaction with the status quo is no more 
surprising than the Academy’s discomfiture.”27 Dow successfully over-
turned the cancellation when Ruckelshaus failed to hold public hearings, 
as required by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act.28   
Most historians credit the 1962 publication of Rachel Carson’s Silent 
Spring as a major influence in the emergence of the modern environ-
mental movement. Carson, however, simply condensed and popularized 
information based on over a decade of studies and growing scientific 
concern in the 1950s over the effects of DDT use on the natural 
environment and human health.29 Given that pesticide use increased 
dramatically between the publication of the book and 1972, the year DDT 
was finally banned, it was a much-needed clarion call.30 While Carson had 
alerted the American public, opponents of chemical pesticides shifted from 
a campaign of public information and education to one of litigation by the 
late 1960s, most significantly in the Wisconsin hearings of 1968 and 1969. 
Using over two decades of scientific studies, the Environmental Defense 
Fund (EDF) successfully changed not only the legal and regulatory climate 
but also public opinion about the necessity of using persistent chemical 
insecticides.31 Although the battle would have to be fought again against 
the EPA, the EDF’s legal efforts finally resulted in the banning of DDT in 
1972. As an iconic chemical, DDT appeared to be the first of many victims 
of the new understandings of the environment influenced by Silent Spring, 
understandings less than sympathetic to industry and industrial 
products.32 The EDF also stood as the exemplar of Metzger’s “coercive 
utopians” or Brandt’s “flower children,” and such groups—local, regional, 
and national—would become the avowed enemies of Dow Chemical.   
Determining the toxicity of 2,4,5-T remained an elusive process, 
although evidence slowly mounted. In a September BioScience article, 
Dow vice-president Johnson presented a lengthy summary of the existing 
                                                 
27 “2,4,5-T Committee:  Bias Untested, Academy Embarrassed,” ibid., 611.  The 
committee was chosen by the USDA, a longtime industry ally. 
28 Van Strum, Bitter Fog, 14, 15. 
29 Thomas R. Dunlap, DDT: Scientists, Citizens, and Public Policy (Princeton, 
N.J., 1981), 59-71. 
30 David Pimentel, “After Silent Spring:  Ecological Effects of Pesticides on Public 
Health and on Birds and Other Organisms,” in Rachel Carson: Legacy and 
Challenge, ed. Lisa Sideris and Kathleen Dean Moore (Albany, N.Y., 2008), 190- 
94. 
31 Dunlap, DDT, 130, 197-209, 231. 
32 Steve Maguire, “Contested Icons:  Rachel Carson and DDT,” in Rachel Carson:  
Legacy and Challenge, ed. Sideris and Moore, 194-214. 
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information on exposure, toxicity, and chemistry of 2,4,5-T. Johnson cited 
extensively from unpublished data from Dow Chemical and concluded that 
“the widespread use of phenoxy herbicides has produced no demonstrable 
evidence of potential harm to man.”33 According to Johnson, the rapid 
degradation of the phenoxy herbicides made them safe for use.  
Disagreement continued, however. Part of the problem, as one researcher 
noted, lay in “the inadequacy of present practices surrounding the design 
and analysis of toxicological experiments.”34 The 1973 announcement of 
the detection of dioxin in frozen fish samples typified the growing body of 
scientific evidence indicating potential harm. The samples, taken by the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science’s 1970 Herbicide 
Assessment Commission, provided the “first hard evidence that TCDD 
[dioxin] is indeed finding its way into animals—and thus into a food chain 
that could include man—in Vietnam.”35 Events in Oregon would bring the 
2,4,5-T/dioxin controversy to a head. 
Carol Van Strum opens her book A Bitter Fog recounting a spring day 
in 1975. Four children had gone fishing in the local river when a tank truck 
sprayed herbicides along the sides of the road, just above the river bank 
where the children played. Drenched, the children all became sick that 
night, with symptoms that included burning skin, mouths, throats, and 
eyes. Garden plants wilted and died, and the family dog was eventually 
paralyzed, covered with oozing sores. This episode marked Van Strum’s 
involvement with a substance that would consume her life, sometimes 
literally, for the next decade. The Van Strums began alerting the county 
health department, wildlife rangers, the Forest Service, and the EPA.  
Their letters to the EPA were answered by the USDA, which reassured the 
Van Strums that no studies had demonstrated the effects they had 
described. Steve Van Strum researched the herbicides at the Oregon State 
University library, and the couple requested a copy of the 1976 
Environmental Impact Study (EIS) put out by the Forest Service. In the 
process of researching the chemical herbicides, the Van Strums contacted 
reporter Thomas Whiteside, who had published extensively on Agent 
Orange herbicides. He referred them to more studies and scientists who 
had expressed concern about the safety of 2,4-D, 2,4,5-T, and the TCDD 
present in the herbicides used to clear roadways and manage local timber 
stands. Frustrated and concerned, the couple let the matter drop.36  
Officials had already ignored earlier concerns. 
                                                 
33 Julius E. Johnson, “The Public Health Implications of Widespread Use of the 
Phenoxy Herbicides and Picloram,” BioScience 21 (1 Sept. 1971): 905. 
34 Theodor D. Sterling, “Difficulty of Evaluating the Toxicity and Teratogenicity of 
2,4,5-T from Existing Animal Experiments,” Science, n.s., 174 (24 Dec. 1971): 
1358. 
35 “Dioxin from Defoliation Found in Vietnam Fish,” Science News 103 (5 May 
1973): 287. 
36  Van Strum, Bitter Fog, 1-9. 
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Dependent on the timber industry for many of its citizens’ economic 
livelihood, Oregon became the battleground over which industry (timber 
and chemical), citizens, and government agencies fought.  As the major 
industry in the state, timber interests exerted significant political and 
social influence throughout the 1950s and 1960s. The state’s 1941 Forest 
Conservation Act effectively decreased the amount of federal regulation, 
and the timber industry acted in its best interests. One problem that 
plagued loggers was the lack of access roads, which made it difficult to 
access valuable old-growth timber.37 Roads would be built and access 
maintained through the application of herbicides. The Forest Service also 
began spraying timber stands with herbicides to achieve better brush 
control and to lessen the chances of fire. Jean Anderson and her husband 
Ugo Pezzi owned a 1,300-acre ranch bordering on Indian Creek, in the 
Five Rivers area and close to the Suislaw National Forest. The couple 
requested information from the Forest Service in 1972 after their land was 
exposed when herbicides were sprayed in 1971. Concerned about the 
herbicides’ effects on their organic beef herds, not to mention their own 
water supply, Anderson and Pezzi requested a public hearing in 1973.  
When the couple filed a lawsuit after a Forest Service official denied the 
public hearing, the Forest Service agreed to not spray the area’s 
watershed.38 Subsequent events late in 1975 ignited local residents’ 
concerns over the potential hazards of the phenoxy herbicides. 
In a December 1975 newspaper article, Oregon State faculty member 
Michael Newton proclaimed the safety of herbicide sprayings and alarmed 
the Van Strums in the process. Newton, a member of the 1974 National 
Academy of Sciences team that assessed herbicide spraying in Vietnam, 
advocated for herbicide spraying to control for undesirable timber growth 
and increase more valuable timber types.  The Van Strums responded to 
the story, and in the process drew the attention of the local community to 
the problems many attributed to herbicide exposure.39 This mobilization 
proved to be the genesis of an organization formed to represent the 
communities of Five Rivers and Deadwood Creek, Citizens Against Toxic 
Sprays (CATS). The situation intensified, and along with the Oregon 
Environmental Council and the Hoedads (a tree planting cooperative), 
CATS filed suit in 1976 to stop spraying in the Suislaw National Forest.  
The groups charged that the Forest Service EIS’s from 1975 to 1977 had 
been inadequate. The Industrial Forestry Association joined the Forest 
Service as a defendant. CATS and its allies filed a new motion that sought 
to ban 2,4-D, 2,4,5-T, and Silvex.40 Tensions rose as local residents 
confronted Forest Service and county officials determined to carry out 
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spraying operations.41 In March, Judge Otto Skopil issued a temporary 
injunction banning the use of 2,4,5-T and Silvex pending Forest Service 
explanation of the effects of dioxin on human and animal health. In 1977, 
Skopil approved the revised EIS, removing the injunction against 
herbicide spraying. Three-fifths of a planned 150,000 acres would be 
sprayed with 2,4,5-T. This would be the state of affairs until the results of a 
controversial EPA study that linked herbicide exposure to miscarriage 
rates three times the national level were released in 1978. 
Dow used several strategies to discredit the possible link between 
2,4,5-T sprayings and miscarriages. In summer 1978, Bonnie Hill and 
seven other women living in Alsea, Oregon, contacted the EPA concerning 
thirteen miscarriages that the eight women had experienced since 1973. In 
response to its investigation, early in March 1979 the EPA issued an 
emergency suspension of 2,4,5-T and Silvex and began a more intensive 
study analyzing greater numbers of soil, water, animal meat, and human 
milk samples to determine the presence of dioxin (this larger and more 
intensive study would be known as Alsea II). The study attracted the 
attention of the mainstream news media, including investigative pieces by 
syndicated columnist Jack Anderson and ABC’s news series 20/20. The 
Council of Agricultural Science and Technology (CAST) criticized the 
20/20 segment. Dow flew Oregon State expert Michael Newton and his 
wife to Midland, Michigan, to strategize.42 CAST, however, had begun to 
attract negative attention of its own, as the full membership of the 
organization, beyond its twenty-five independent societies became known.  
Over two hundred agricultural business corporations and industrial trade 
organizations also belonged to the organization, and those members 
provided 57 percent of its operating budget. Such relationships raised 
questions about the group’s claim to scientific neutrality.43 Dow itself 
challenged the Alsea study as “unscientific” and “seriously flawed.”44 Dow 
chairman Earle B. Barnes betrayed a more revealing attitude in a written 
response to a clergyman when he characterized the Alsea area as one 
similar to “northern California and other northwestern states in growing 
marijuana in open spaces and in forests.” These illegal marijuana crops, 
worth $900 million in California alone, were susceptible to the 2,4,5-T 
                                                 
41 Van Strum, Bitter Fog, 91, 92. 
42 Robbins, Landscapes of Conflict, 200-203. 
43 Robin Marentz Henig, “Agriculture’s Strange Bedfellows: CAST-Industry Tie 
Raises Credibility Concerns,”  BioScience 29 (Jan. 1979): 9. The May 1979 issue 
contained several letters to the editor regarding the CAST article, among them 
one from John E. Donalds, Agricultural Products Department, Dow Chemical 
U.S.A.  Donalds questioned whether “highly respected and dedicated scientists” 
could be bought for $5,000 annual dues.  “CAST Profile Evokes Avid Response,” 
BioScience 29 (May, 1979): 279. 
44 Jeffrey Smith, “EPA Halts Most Use of Herbicide 2,4,5-T,” Science, n.s., 203 
(16 March 1979): 1090-92; “Dow Attacks Study Used to Ban 2,4,5-T,” Science 
News 115 (17 March 1979): 166. 
 
 
Amy M. Hay // Science and Government Regulation in 1970s America 13 
herbicides used by the Forest Service to kill underbrush. Barnes implied 
that the reports, which had shown “no valid relationship between the 
spraying and miscarriages,” were prompted by financial interests rather 
than health concerns.45 In a more creative fashion, Dow offered a scientific 
discovery as one explanation for the ubiquitous presence of dioxin.    
In 1977, Dow scientists focused their energies on discovering the 
source of dioxin contamination that had polluted the Tittabawassee River, 
the major waterway in which Dow discharged its manufacturing wastes.  
Their concern was increased by the knowledge that the EPA or the 
Michigan Department of Natural Resources could shut down the Midland 
plant, which was the only Dow facility that manufactured pesticides. In 
November 1977, Dow company officials announced they had found the 
culprit:  the “entire environment.” Dioxin levels were detected not only in 
fish from the river, but also in ash from incinerators, power plants, 
fireplaces and charcoal grills—anyplace where combustion took place. In 
the words of one official, “We now think dioxins have been with us since 
the advent of fire.”46 Warren B. Crummett, the technical director of Dow’s 
analytical labs, discussed the hypothesis, “the trace chemistries of fire,” in 
his 2002 memoir, Decades of Dioxin: Limelight on a Molecule. Crummett 
criticized the EPA’s failure to achieve balanced scientific judgment on 
acceptable dioxin levels, claiming that “veiled advocacy is still evident in 
the interpretation of the data.”47 John Davidson, a Dow chemist, gave a 
more forthcoming description of the discovery: “We learned so much 
about dioxins in order to defend our pesticides.”48 If nothing else, the 
discovery of the universal presence of dioxins, according to the scientist in 
charge of the investigative team, meant that no one needed to worry about 
them. At the very least, Dow scientists offered up the theory as one reason 
for the geographic presence of dioxin contamination.49   
Scientists continued to debate the safety of 2,4,5-T and its associated 
dioxin contamination, even as the EPA fought to maintain its emergency 
suspension of the chemical. Some confidently proclaimed that the 
herbicide posed no hazard to human or animal kind, even if the individual 
invoked less than reliable support, such as Auburn professor Donald E. 
Davis did in a 1979 BioScience article looking at the history of 2,4,5-T.  
Davis gave a general account of the chemical’s history, but also relied on a 
1974 CAST report and the contradictory National Academy of Science’s 
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report on herbicides in Vietnam.50 Professor Arthur Galston, who had 
worked on the plant growth inhibitors as a graduate student at the 
University of Illinois, offered a much more cautious, although no more 
definitive, assessment of 2,4,5-T. He recognized that industry and 
environmental scientists disagreed on the evidence and what policy 
decisions should be made. His own professional judgment urged “extreme 
caution,” and he acknowledged that other classes of herbicides might 
prove equally dangerous. No matter the financial or emotional cost, 
however, Galston cautioned that the public welfare might demand the 
banning of industry’s favorite compounds.51 An April 12, 1979, court ruling 
denied the request by a coalition of timber industry, chemical 
manufacturers, and herbicide applicators (including Dow) that the 
emergency suspension be lifted. The EPA’s case, dependent on the Alsea 
study, appeared to be weak. It was not helped by the conviction of one of 
its lead scientific witnesses for stealing funds from his government grant.52  
For Dow management, it was imperative to fight to keep 2,4,5-T legal. As 
Dow executive Paul Oreffice described it: “If we let them ban a product 
that has 30 years of studies behind that says it’s safe, what happens to the 
next product, and the next product, and the next?”53 The court case 
dragged until Dow eventually conceded the battle in 1983, $10 million 
later.   
Dow continued to fight Americans’ changed environmental 
consciousness, as it defended its pesticide products. A 1981 issue of The 
Bottom Line, Dow’s free newsletter, proclaimed the publication as the 
“final conclusion about the role of pesticides in society . . . THE BOTTOM 
LINE is also an information clearinghouse for scientific facts about the 
pesticide dilemma.”54 The lead story, entitled “A Familiar Scenario with a 
New Cast,” examined the script written by the Alsea, Oregon, case and the 
“pesticide road show being restaged in Missoula, Montana; Ashford, 
Washington and Peevy’s Crossing, Oklahoma.”55 The article went on to 
applaud the formation of a group in Montana, Citizens for Food and Fiber, 
dedicated to “prompt collective action. . . .”  Another citizens’ group had 
formed in Washington, the Washington State Pest Management Alliance, 
committed to “scientific reason and rationale” in putting out the anti-
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pesticide fires. As the article editorialized, “It is time for more of this kind 
of citizen action, where grass roots elements representing farmers, 
foresters, applicators, agri-women and other proponents of free enterprise 
defend the agricultural chemical tools that are important to everyone’s 
standard of living.” Finally, The Bottom Line included a poem by an 
anonymous author, “Silent Fall.” A clear satire of Silent Spring, the poem 
told of the downfall of civilization as society banned a wide array of 
agricultural chemicals, condemning the surviving humans to grow their 
own food. “The remaining few lived like animals. Feeding themselves on 
creatures and plants around them. And these were called Organic 
Foods.”56 
Dow Chemical spent more than a decade fighting the agenda of the 
“coercive utopians” and defending the free enterprise system. In the 
process, it played a major role in contesting the scientific knowledge of 
herbicide safety, the right of the state to set regulatory policy, and the 
concerns of ordinary citizens over the safety of everyday chemicals that 
were sprayed on their fields and trees. It appears unclear whether Dow 
Chemical won its case against the covert, subversive “flower children” 
determined to change business as usual in Washington and throughout the 
country.  Ironically, by the end the company seemed to have conceded the 
success and power of the counter-culture, seeking to create its own 
grassroots social movement of farmers, sprayers, and agri-women. Given 
its involvement with some of the most contentious events in the postwar 
period—the use of napalm and Agent Orange during the Vietnam War, 
toxic chemicals and the emergence of a risk-averse society—Dow tried to 
remain true to its vision of an America composed of free opinions, citizens, 




56 Ibid., 3. 
